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Abstract  
 
Pakistan faces today high levels of population growth entailing a large population of 
schooling age, and low levels of economic development, with increasing spread of 
poverty and unemployment over the past few decades. While education has been 
emphasized by the government and international development agencies to play a 
central role for the successful development of Pakistan, progress realized at all levels 
have been meagre and this for two main reasons: The investments in education have 
been too low and the schooling age population has been growing too fast. With 35 
per cent of its population below age 15 in 2010; Pakistan was spending less than 3 
per cent of its GNP on education. Consequently still 39 per cent of 15-24 year old 
Pakistani women were illiterate in 2008 and 21 per cent of men (UNESCO database) 
 Still Pakistan is experiencing a decline in birth rates and population growth 
begins to level off as part of the demographic transition. The last Demographic and 
Health Survey of Pakistan conducted in 2006-2007 shows that highly educated 
women are at the forefront of the fertility decline with a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.3 
children – close to replacement -- contrasting with the TFR of 4.8 for women with no 
education. The paper will explore through multi-state population projections by levels 
of educational attainment how the potential fertility and educational developments 
could impact on future population growth and on the human capital of the country to 
2050.  
 The next few decades will be crucial for Pakistan as the majority of its 
population will be of working age – at present the median age in Pakistan is 21.7 
years. The demographic bonus could however transform into demographic distress 
and social unrest if decision makers fail to improve education levels and to develop 
the economy to provide work opportunities for the coming generation of more 
educated male and female Pakistani. The objective of this paper is two folds: (a) To 
emphasize human capital development in Pakistan and changes in levels of 
educational attainment, especially of women and its impact on the demographic 
transition, and (b) to look at how women’s education can influence fertility and limit 
population growth. 
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Alternative Population and Education Trajectories for Pakistan  
Asif Wazir, Anne Goujon, Wolfgang Lutz  
  
The history of education is closely intertwined with the past and present demographic 
history of Pakistan. There are two explanations. First of all, levels of education are 
clearly influencing the demographic behaviour of the people and the most visible 
impact of education is on women’s fertility, which is systematically lower at higher 
levels of educational attainment as we will see in the case of Pakistan. 
Repercussions of education can be seen on other demographic indicators such as 
mortality e.g., maternal education lowers infant and child mortality, as well as 
maternal mortality.  
 The second explanation is that education at the macro-level acts as a good 
proxy for development. Hence measuring a population levels of educational 
attainment, whether in the work force or in the overall population is a valid measure 
of the well-being of individuals in terms of economic well-being i.e., poverty and 
competitiveness of the economy or social well being e.g., autonomy of women, civil 
freedom. The case of Pakistan is puzzling. On one hand education has been one of 
the top priorities in the political discourse for many decades while at the same time, 
very little has been actually done in terms of investments in education and in 2000, 
with about one-third of the young population not enrolling in school, Pakistan was 
spending less than 2 per cent of its GDP on education 
 Investments have increased in the last ten years but the inertia of education 
diffusion is such that it will take many more years before Pakistan can benefit from a 
well-educated work force in a country where population growth remains very high – 
slightly below 2 per cent. As an effect of fertility reductions, the schooling age 
population (5-19) has started to decline since 2008 – after growing at a yearly rate 
above 3 per cent between 1967 and 1996. This implies a relative lessening of 
pressures on the Pakistani school system that will be facing the challenge of 
increasing the “quantity” of education offered (school facilities, teachers, etc.) while 
not compromising on the quality (Behrman et al 1997, 2006). Another challenge will 
be to create the economic conditions to employ those populations since the working 
age population is growing very fast in Pakistan, above 3 per cent per year on 
average. In this chapter we will review changes in the literacy and education levels of 
the population over the last few decades. Based on projections, we will show what 
could the implications of future fertility and education developments on the size and 
quality of the Pakistani population until 2050 according to several scenarios.  
1. Background: The Last 30 Years 
 
Aly (2007) in his white paper for a national education policy summarizes with elegant 
severity educational policy developments in the past since independence of the 
country in 1947: “Periodically, the State of Pakistan addressed the educational needs 
of the people and the aspirations of the State in this regard, in 1947, 1951, 1959, 
1966, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1979, 1992 and lastly in 1998. Apart from the common 
denominator of Islam and national cohesion, the statements of vision and purpose for 
the national education system in Pakistan have tended to reflect the dominant 
political paradigm and compulsions of the day. Impliedly, most of these noble 
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assertions remained rhetoric, now confined to the dustbins of history.” Whether the 
failure lays in the lack of investments or in the implementation, a look at Table 1 on 
literacy rates from 1951 to 2009 gives a good measure of the gap between discourse 
and action. The overall increase in literacy rates from 16 per cent in 1951 to 57 per 
cent in 2009 is already not impressive over that length of time, and even more so 
when looking at the literacy figures of women which have been stagnating for thirty 
years from 1951 to 1981. The differences between the different provinces and 
between the different federal administered areas are huge pointing at a lack of 
homogeneity in levels of development and consequently the spread of education 
between regions, particularly visible in the difference between urban and rural areas. 
The literacy rate was for instance four times higher in Islamabad compared to that in 
the tribal areas (FATA) – 87 per cent versus 22 per cent. 
 
Table 1. Literacy rates (in per cent), males, females, both sexes, all country, 
provinces, and federal administered areas (FDA), from 1951 to 2009 
By: 1951 1961 1972 1981 1998 2004 2009 
Sex 
Male 19 27 30 35 55 66 69 
Female 12 8 12 16 32 42 45 
Both sexes 16 16 22 26 44 54 57 
Province 
Punjab   21 27 47  59 
Sindh   30 32 45  59 
KPK   16 17 35  50 
Balochistan   10 10 27  45 
FDA 
Islamabad    48 73  87 
Azad Kashmir    26 55 62  
Gilgit Baltistan    3 38  53 
Tribal areas    6 17  22 
Source: Wikipedia  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Pakistan#Literacy_rate (consulted on 
3/10/2011) 
Table 2 shows the progress and most of the time the lack of progress in levels of 
educational attainment as can be seen from the population across censuses with a 
majority of that population being uneducated until the 21st century, and it was still the 
case of two-third of women in 2005. For those who had access to education, the path 
often stopped at the level of lower secondary education (below matriculation level) 
and a small share of the male and female population gained an upper education i.e., 
upper secondary or university education. 
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Table 2. Educational attainment of the working age population (20-64), in percent 
Census Gender 
No 
Education 
Primary  
Incomplete 
Primary 
 Complete 
Lower  
Secondary 
Upper  
Secondary Higher 
1972 
Male 68 3 10 14 3 2 
Female 92 1 3 3 1 1 
1981 
Male 66 na 12 16 3 3 
Female 88 na 5 5 1 1 
1998 
Male 48 6 12 24 5 6 
Female 74 4 7 10 3 3 
2005 
Male 34 5 15 29 8 9 
Female 64 3 11 13 4 5 
Source: Goujon and Wazir (2011) 
Enrolment ratios inform the present situation in school and represent the engine of 
future human capital. 
  Table 3 is showing the data for gross enrolment ratio for the last 10 years, 
and those demonstrates quite strong progress at the level of primary and lower 
secondary education. However net enrolment ratios1
Table 3. Gross enrolment ratios in per cent, 2000-2009 
 show that all children are far 
from entering primary schools at the official school age – 72 per cent for boys and 60 
per cent for girls in 2009 – and even more so in secondary schools 36 per cent for 
boys and 29 per cent for girls in 2009.  
Level Sex 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Primary 
Male 82 83 84 85 91 94 89 93 93 92 
Female 56 56 57 62 66 71 69 76 77 77 
Lower secondary 
Male 
... ... ... 38 41 43 47 51 50 49 
Female 
... ... ... 26 29 32 35 38 38 38 
Upper secondary 
Male 
... ... ... 24 27 24 24 26 28 28 
Female 
... ... ... 21 23 20 19 20 21 22 
Tertiary Male 
... ... 3 3 3 5 5 6 6 ... 
 
 A similar story of the difference between intention and action of the successive 
governments of Pakistan as was reported for education can be told regarding public 
policy towards population growth and fertility reductions. The first anti-natalist 
population policy in Pakistan was written in 1965 (Sathar 2001) and was pursued 
under the population program with, in fact, very little success due to a lack of 
commitment and funding. If the government of Pakistan has recognized the need for 
fertility to go down, especially by reducing unwanted pregnancies and investing 
consequently in the provision and utilization of adequate services for reproductive 
                                                 
1
 Gross enrolment ratio is defined as the number of pupils (of any age) who are enrolled in a particular level as a 
percentage of the total children of official school age population for that level. The net enrolment ratio is defined 
as the number of children of official school age for a particular level that are enrolled in that level as a 
percentage of the total children of the official school age population. Hence the difference between gross and net 
enrolment ratio indicates the extent of over-aged and under-aged enrolment. Source: UNESCO Database 
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health and family planning, surely the lack of social and economic progress – in 
education, health, poverty – has been hindering the fertility decline and the efficiency 
of population policies. The education developments shown above point a slow 
increases in levels of educational attainment that would be otherwise key to impact 
on the fertility of women by levels of education who is very much responding to these 
since women in Pakistan have been experiencing lower levels of fertility for a long 
period of time. Already in 1993, Sathar and Oppenheim Mason were inkling at the 
fact that women’s education is a “potentially powerful force for fertility change in 
urban Pakistan” not only as a unintended consequence of women’s schooling which 
mechanically delays entry at marriage, but also was changing the behaviour of 
parents who had the need and the will to limit the number of children they would 
have. 
 Hence educated couples will be more prone to use modern birth control 
techniques, towards which they will have a better perception and an easier access 
than less educated couples (Saleem and Bobak 2005), even in “backward” regions 
such as Balochistan (Kakar et al. 2011). Thus, if the women education was improved, 
significant decline in fertility and consequently in population growth would achieve 
(see Abadian 1996, Jejeebhoy 1995, Castro Martin and Juarez 1995 on relationship 
between women’s education and fertility).The survey data on fertility levels by 
women’s educational attainment detailed in Table 4 show a consistent difference of 
2-3 children between those women who did not receive any education and those who 
received a secondary or post-secondary education. In 2006, the latest study 
available on fertility differentials by education showed that those are quite significant 
in Pakistan, with women with no education having more than twice the fertility of 
those who have a university education. This negative relationship between education 
and fertility had been recognized in all countries at all stages of development, 
particularly very strong in those countries that are in the middle of the demographic 
transition (Cleland 2002, Martin and Jaurez 1995), as is currently Pakistan. Soomro 
and Mahmood (2004) argue that any family planning programme in Pakistan would 
be weak in reaching illiterate women and that therefore investment in female 
education should be prioritized.  
Table 4. Total fertility rates (TFR) by levels of education attainment, 1975, 1990-
1991, and 2006-2007 
Level 1975a 1990-91b 1997 c 2006-07 b 
No education 6.5 5.7 6.0 4.8 
Primary 5.9 4.9 4.9 4.0 
Middle 
3.4 
4.5 4.4 3.2 
Secondary 
3.6 
3.1 3.1 
Tertiary 3.5 2.3 
Total 6.3 4.9 4.0 4.1 
Note: (a) Pakistan fertility survey; (b) Pakistan Demographic and Health Surveys, (c) Pakistan Fertility 
and Family Planning Survey 
5 
 
2. Future Challenges 
 
The section above has shown that the future economic and population growth of 
Pakistan will be dependent on the future fertility and education paths taken by the 
country. We will explore in this section through several scenarios the future of human 
capital in Pakistan from 2010 until 2060, based on projections of population by levels. 
 The methodology is based on the multi-state population projection method 
(see Rogers 1975 and 1985 for more details), using the PDE population projection 
software2
 Each subpopulation is further stratified by five years age-group and sex to 
which are applied education specific fertility, mortality and migration. Furthermore, 
transition rates between education categories allow the modelling of changes in the 
education sector. The Population pyramid of Pakistan in 2010 by four levels of 
education is shown in Figure 1. 
. The population of Pakistan is subdivided into four educational categories - 
no education, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education.  
Figure 1. Population pyramid of Pakistan in 2010, by four levels of education 
 
Source: PDHS 2006-07, UN 2010 world population prospects 
3. Fertility 
 
The pace of fertility decline in Pakistan, which started in the early 1990s, has been 
very slow compared to other countries in the South Asian region. The basic premise 
for the scenario making about future fertility is that the fertility transition that is 
underway essentially continues in future. The recent evidence shows that Pakistan is 
in the middle of its demographic transition and forecasts further fertility decline in the 
                                                 
2
 Developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in 1993, it can be downloaded free of 
charge from this link: www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/pub/software/pde/pdesetup.zip  
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future (see Sathar and Casterline 1998, Sathar 2007, Ali and Hussain 2001 for 
details about fertility levels and trends in Pakistan). In longer horizon, the future level 
of fertility will determine by the general socio-economic and cultural changes. The 
prediction of these trends is not easier than that of the direction of fertility change 
itself. In this context, the national policies and family-planning programs will play a 
significant role, if these policies are well integrated into other government policies 
(e.g., on education and health) and particularly, if the socio-economic development of 
the population has reached a certain point at which large segment of the society 
considered the family size limitation advantageous.  
 We are here considering three scenarios of fertility, Table 5 namely High, 
Medium and National Fertility Goal (NG) to answer the following question: Based on 
the past experience of fertility stagnation and slower decline in Pakistan, whether 
fertility transition have the right pace to achieve the national population policy goals 
2010 (National Goal scenario), and most importantly what will be the consequence in 
term of population growth if these goals are achieved or not? The TFR in the High 
and Medium scenarios follow the assumption of the United Nations 2010 World 
Population Prospects (TFR respectively 2.3 and 1.8 in 2055-60) and the NG scenario 
typically implements the target set by the government of Pakistan in its National 
Population Policy (NPP) 2010: 3 children per women by the year 2015-2020 and 
replacement fertility level fertility (i.e., 2.1 children per women) by 2025-30. Beyond 
2025-30, the NPP does not assume any specific goal. Since the pace of decline in 
the NG scenario in the near future will be much faster than in the High and Medium 
scenarios, we assumed a continuation of the rapid pace using the low fertility 
scenario of the UN leading to a TFR of 1.3 in 2055-60. 
 
Table 5. Projection of TFR by level of education in Pakistan from 2010-2060  
 TFR 
 Observed 
2006-2007 
Base-year 
2005-2010 
High  
2025-30 
Medium 
2025-30 
NG 
2025-30 
No Education 4.8 4.2 3.4 2.8 2.4 
Primary 4.0 3.6 2.8 2.4 2.1 
Secondary 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.0 1.8 
Tertiary 2.3 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.4 
Total 4.1 3.7 2.9 2.4 2.1 
Total in 2055-60   2.3 1.8 1.3 
Source: PDHS 2006-07 and authors ‘calculations based on UN (2010) 
 In the High scenario, the educational fertility differentials are obtained by 
keeping the relative ratio of different education specific fertility to the overall total 
fertility rate in 2005-10 constant over the projection period. For the Medium and the 
NG scenarios, we assumed convergence, meaning that fertility differentials by 
education tend to diminish as fertility declines. We chose the relative ratios of the 
different education specific fertility to the overall total fertility rate observed in the 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh that had reached below replacement fertility level in 
2005-06 – TFR is 1.8 according to the National Fertility and Health Survey 3 (NFHS) 
– as a target and assume that in 2055-60, Pakistan will have education-specific 
fertility rates to those of Andhra Pradesh state (India) today. 
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Table 6. Education-specific and total TFRs for Andhra Pradesh 2005-06 
Mothers ‘education Total fertility rates 
No education 2.1 
Primary 1.9 
Secondary 1.8 
Tertiary 1.6 
Total 1.8 
Source: Andhra Pradesh-NFHS-3 2005-06 
It is important to note that Andhra Pradesh has experienced a rapid fertility decline in 
very short time period (TFR 4.5 in 1971-73 to 2.7 in 1992-94 and 1.79 in 2005-06) 
like some other southern India States e.g., Kerala and Tamil Nadu, where on an 
aggregate level, female education and literacy has been proven to be one of the 
strongest variable explaining fertility decline (Krishnan 1976, Bhat and Rajan 1990), 
together with improved health facilities (K.S. 1999).  
 The Pakistan record on the education front has not been impressive due to 
low levels of public expenditure on education. In a recent study, Goujon and Wazir 
(2011) have clearly shown that, the Pakistani educational system has thus failed to 
provide the basic infrastructure, eliminate gender imbalances and the quality of 
education, which would be required to enjoy the full collateral benefits of education 
such as high levels of economic growth and well-being. In this context, we have 
defined three scenarios of educational attainment (see Table 7) based on the 
assumption that education will be crucial for socio-economic development in 
Pakistan. The assumptions are set in terms of age and sex specific transition 
probabilities between levels of education to model the age specific proportion of 
young men and women (here between age 5 to 24 years) who make the transition 
from no education to primary, from primary to secondary and from secondary to 
tertiary education3
 The Constant scenario assumes constant transition as observed in the 
population aged 5-24 in 2010, to show the progress that already embedded in the 
present levels of educational attainment. The Trend scenario looks at the pace of 
change in the last two decades and prolongs it into the future. It will be compared to 
the Goal scenario that shows the unlikely case that Pakistan attains the national and 
international targets in terms of education. A comparison between the Trend and the 
Goal Scenarios will show to what extent, Pakistan has adopted the right pace of 
educational improvements to attain the targets set by national and international 
agencies.  
. 
 The particular objectives in terms of education set on the national and 
international agenda are the following: • Universal primary education: All children should be able to complete primary 
education by 2015-20 (MDGs and National Education Policy). • All gender disparities will be eliminated from all levels of education by 2015-
2020.  
                                                 
3
 Although transitions can in theory happen at any age – for instance, those who become literate by the mean of 
adult literacy campaigns. 
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• Enrolment in secondary and tertiary education should increase. We translated 
this into specific targets: 80 per cent of 10-14 years (male and female) old 
would be enrolled in secondary and 50 per cent of 20-24 years (male and 
female) old would be enrolled in tertiary education by 2055-60. 
 
Table 7. Proportion of respective age groups in education (in per cent) 
Categories Base year (2010) Trend Scenario 
(2055-60) 
Goal Scenario 
(2055-60) 
 Male Female Male Female Both sexes 
No education 17 30 12 11 0 
Primary 83 70 88 89 100 
Secondary 61 45 55 46 80 
Tertiary 18 16 19 20 50 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The age and sex specific mortality and migration rates4 follow the latest medium 
variant of the United Nations world population prospects (2010). The mortality 
differentials are set according to findings of K.C. et al. (2010)5
 Table 8 shows the matrix of the nine scenarios derived from the different 
fertility (3 sets) and education (3 sets) assumptions, aiming at studying the 
concomitant effect of fertility and education on future population and human capital. 
Due to space limitation all these scenarios cannot be discussed here. 
. Age and sex specific 
net international migration figures are further distributed proportionally among 
educational categories.  
 
Table 8. Scenario matrix 
 Education 
Constant (Ec) Trend (Et) National education goals 
(Eng) 
Fertility High (Fh) Fh Ec Fh Et Fh Eng 
Medium (Fm) Fm Ec Fm Et Fm Eng 
National fertility goals (Fng) Fng Ec Fng Et Fng Eng 
  
 Even if we assume that Pakistan will manage to achieve below replacement 
fertility in the low variant – TFR of 1.3 in 2055-60, the population would still grow 
significantly from 174 million in 2010 to 259 million under the national goal education 
scenario. A doubling (to 345 million in 2060) of population would only occur in the 
case of the High fertility scenario, where fertility is declining slowly to reach 2.3 in 
2055-60 and enrolment stagnates (Constant education scenario). Education 
attainment could have a profound effect on the total population: Under the High 
                                                 
4
 UN 2010 provides the total number of migrants but not the age and sex specific structure which we estimated 
through a residual analysis. 
5
 According to K.C. et al. (2010), the life expectancy at age 15 of the population in the no-education category is 
on average one year less than that of the population in the primary education category, three years less than that 
Population in the secondary education category and five years less than that of population in the tertiary 
education category. 
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fertility scenario, if Pakistan would achieve the national educational goals, then the 
total population would be 25 million less compared to the Constant education 
scenario – or 7 per cent in 2055-60. A lesser difference of 19 million in 2060 is found 
in the total population between the scenario where Pakistan achieves its education 
and fertility goals, and that more realistic where it achieves Medium fertility and 
follows the Trend in education development: 259 million vs. 278 million.  
 
Table  9. Total population (in million) of Pakistan from 2010-2060 
Fertility:  Education: 
Base year Constant Trend NG 
2010 2030 2060 2030 2060 2030 2060 
High 
174 
 
249 345 249 341 248 320 
Medium 233 279 233 278 233 271 
NG 235 267 235 266 234 259 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Figure 2 shows the population pyramids by age, sex and four educational level of 
Pakistan in 2010 and the results of three alternative scenarios for education in 2060, 
under the assumption of a Medium fertility scenario. In 2010, the pyramid clearly 
shows the improvements in school enrolments over the last three decades: The 
younger cohorts are better educated than the older ones, both for men and women. 
In 2010, 50 per cent of the working age population (WAP) – aged 20-64 which 
accounted for 49 percent of the total population had not received any education: one-
third of the male WAP and two-thirds of the female WAP (see also Figure 3 and the 
Appendix Table.  
 According to the Trend education scenario, Figure 2, which assumes that all 
future cohorts benefit from increase in enrolment ratios as observed over the recent 
past, the pace of change would not be enough to ensure that all children enrol into 
primary education as can be seen from the share with no education in age groups 5-
9 and 10-14. Consequently, Pakistan would not be able to achieve the Millennium 
Developments Goals (MDGs) in 2015, and not even in 2060. Therefore, this calls for 
an intensification of investments in basic education to ensure that more children can 
enrol in schools, particularly in rural and remote areas, especially girls. The 
proportion of the WAP with no education would decline to 20 percent in 2060 – 15 
per cent for males and 23 per cent for female, based on the Trend education 
scenario.  
 This is far from the 7 per cent – 5 per cent for male and 9 per cent for female – 
that would be achieved under the NG scenario. The momentum of education 
diffusion is clearly visible on the pyramid for that particular optimistic scenario, where 
still in 2060, the population above 50 years of age still entails a large share of 
uneducated people. Lack of education often results in illiteracy and the spread of 
adult literacy campaign would need to intensify in order to bring literacy to the 
population who have never or barely been enrolled, and are beyond schooling age, 
as was effectively implemented in India. Historically adult literacy campaigns have 
not been a priority of the government of Pakistan although some initiatives have been 
launched in the 1980s and 1990s (Goujon and Wazir 2011).  
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 On the other hand, there will be significant increase in the share of the WAP 
with a primary education, from 14 per cent in 2010 to 36 per cent 2060 according to 
Trend scenario (see figure 4). Improvements will be significant for the share of the 
population with a tertiary education, which will more than triple over the projection 
period from 11 per cent in 2010 to 37 per cent in 2060 under NG scenario (EngFm). 
The projection results show the overall long time horizon needed to see the effect of 
the implementation of higher education in Pakistan.  
 For instance, the Trend scenario shows a slight increase in the proportion of 
highly educated – secondary and tertiary education together – in the WAP, from 36 
per cent in 2010 to 46 per cent in 2060, while the corresponding proportion for NG 
scenario will be 67 per cent in 2060. 
Figure 2. Population pyramid by age, sex and educational attainment for Pakistan in 
2010 and in 2060 according to three education scenarios, Constant, Trend and NG, 
and Medium Fertility variant. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: Ec= Constant Education, Et=Trend education, Eng=national educational goals and Fm= Medium 
fertility. 
 Figure 2 also shows that the Trend education scenario would not be enough to 
remove the gender gap which persists at all levels. For example, the proportion of 
uneducated women aged 20-24 years in 2010 is twice then share of uneducated 
men. One out of four women aged 15 and over will be out of school while the 
proportion for men is “only” 16 per cent. Under the NG scenario, the proportion of 
uneducated women of aged 15 and over would be 16 per cent compared to 8 per 
cent for men in 2060, due to the momentum of education diffusion. The impact of 
educational improvement is clearly visible for secondary and tertiary education in the 
NG scenario, which implements rapid improvements in education (i.e., universal 
primary education). The gender gap that was noticeable regarding secondary 
education in 2010 will persist although it will be attenuated. In 2010, the population 
with some secondary education in female aged 20-64 years was 6 million (5 percent) 
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compared to 15 million (34 percent) for male. In 2060, according to the Trend 
education scenario, the WAP would be 18 million (21 per cent) and 28 million (34 per 
cent) for female and male respectively. The future educational attainment of the 
population under the education Trend scenario reflects the education policy 
orientations of the government of Pakistan in recent years. In 2010, the share of 
tertiary educated women of working age was only 5 per cent (3.2 million), and 
corresponding share for men was 14 per cent (6.4 million). The gender gap would be 
eliminated in 2060, based on the Trend scenario; the share of female and male in the 
WAP with a tertiary education would reach 18 per cent (15 million) and 20 per cent 
(16 million) respectively – which reflects that women have benefited from an 
increased access to tertiary education in the recent past.  
Still the lack of investments in female education in the past will hamper the 
development of Pakistan far into the future as it is hindering the full participation of 
women in the labour force. In 2008, according to the Labour Force Survey, women 
accounted only for 20 per cent of the active labour force. 
Figure 3. Share of working age population (20-64) by level of education in Pakistan 
for 2010-2060, different education and fertility scenarios 
. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 Based on past experience, it does not really come as a surprise that Pakistan 
will not be able to achieve the educational development goals (either national or 
international) in the future, if the pace of change witnessed in the recent past 
continues. 
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Table 10 shows the access to education of boys and girls according to the Trend 
education & Medium fertility scenario, shedding some light on the feasibility to 
achieve the Millennium development goals of universal primary education and gender 
gap elimination by 2015. In view of those results, there would still be 31 per cent of 
the 5-9 age-group who would not go to school by 2015 far from the full intake 
envisioned by the MDG for education, with a large gender gap as 34 per cent of girls 
and 27 per cent of boys aged 5-9 would not be in school in 2015. 
 In fact, the MDGs would not even be achieved by 2060 as 21 per cent of the 
children in that age group would still not be enrolled fifty years from now, which calls 
for further investment in the education sector. Moreover, gender disparities will be far 
from eliminated at both levels of primary and secondary education in 2015 where 
girls would still have 12 per cent less chances than boys to reach a primary education 
and 16 per cent less to enrol into secondary education in 2015.  
Table 10. Access to education of male and female, in per cent, Trend education 
scenario and Medium fertility scenario, 2015-20 and 2055-60. 
 2015-2020 2055-60 
 Boys Girls Total Boys  Girls  Total 
No Education 27 34 31 23 18 21 
Primary 84 72 78 89 87 89 
Secondary 50 34 42 55 46 50 
Tertiary 19 15 16 19 21 20 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 Although improvements would be significant by 2060, the probability of girls 
enrolling in primary and secondary schools would still be 2 per cent and 9 per cent 
respectively lower than for boys. Interestingly, and as mentioned before gender 
disparities would be eliminated at the level of tertiary education, where the increase 
in the last few years has been substantial and even more so for girls than boys. 
Hence, by 2015 female would still have 4 per cent less chances than male to enter a 
tertiary education but the relationship would be reversed by 2060 where more women 
than men would enrol in tertiary education. Even though, the projection also shows 
that the rapid increase at secondary and tertiary level foreseen by the national goals 
would also be quasi-impossible to be reached by 2060 according to present pace.  
 Figure 4 compares the output of four different scenarios in terms of the 
educational attainment of women of reproductive age (typically 15-49 years). In 2010, 
the share of illiterate fecund women exceeded 50 per cent. According to the Trend 
education scenarios, two significant improvements will happen in the future. The 
share of women with no formal education will decline from 55 per cent in 2010 to 19 
per cent in 2060, while, the proportion of primary educated women will increase 
significantly – from 15 per cent in 2010 to 40 per cent in 2060. The share women with 
a tertiary level will increase from 10 per cent in 2010 to 18 per cent in 2060. Under 
the NG scenario, the share of women with no formal education will be eliminated in 
2060. The comparison of different education scenarios shows the tremendous 
potential impact of educational attainment of future mothers, and may serve as an 
input to estimate future levels of fertility and of infant and child mortality. 
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Figure 4. Share of women aged (15-49) by level of education in Pakistan, 2010-2060. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 5 clearly shows the significant difference in total fertility rates according to 
different education scenarios, and hence education composition of women in fertile 
ages. The Trend and Constant education scenarios are quite close, indicating that, in 
the past two decades the improvements were not sufficient to impact on fertility 
levels. If Pakistan would attain the national educational goals under the medium 
fertility, total fertility rate in 2060 would be 0.12 children per woman less as compared 
to Trend education scenario. On the other hand, according to NG fertility scenario, 
the difference in TFR between national education goals and Trend education will be 
0.13 children per women. It is worth noting here, although it is highly hypothetical and 
counter intuitive, that, if national educational milestones are accomplished under a 
high fertility scenario, the TFR in 2060 would be 0.42 children less as compared to 
Trend education scenario – TFRs: 1.8 vs. 2.2.  
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Figure 5. Total Fertility rate in Pakistan under three fertility and three education 
scenarios. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The future of Pakistan and its ability to develop is highly dependent on progress in 
the educational attainment of the population, in a context of rapid population growth. 
This study demonstrates the importance of investments in education in the near 
future so that Pakistan can harvest the fruit of long term human capital development. 
Lacks of investments in primary and secondary education, poor infrastructure and 
political instability have failed Pakistan for the achievement of satisfactory levels of 
education in Pakistan, especially for female. As a result, Pakistan will fail to achieve 
the Millennium Development Education Goals in terms of universal primary education 
for boys and girls. The scenarios that we looked at in this paper show that Pakistan 
needs to boost up the speed of change in education, especially since Pakistan will be 
soon experiencing a demographic bonus, a relative increase in the size of the 
working age population in comparison to the inactive part of the population – the 
young and old generations – which is most favourable for socio-economic 
development, that is if the country manages to increase the quality of human capital 
by 2060.  
 We show that female education is very crucial and high political commitments 
will be highly needed, for advancing through the demographic transition, and 
economic development The past lack of investments in female education will hamper 
the development of Pakistan far into the future unless effective adult educational 
campaign are implemented to bring at least literacy to many women who come to 
adulthood without being able to read and write. 
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 Appendix Table A. Population aged 15+ and WAP, in 2010 and according to nine scenarios, 2030 and 20606
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: e1=No Education, e2= Primary, e3=Secondary, e4=Tertiary, WAP=working age  
                                                 
6
 Detailed results of the population by age, sex, and education, from 2010 to 2060, according to the different scenarios can be made available by the authors upon 
request. 
 
Population (in million) 
15+ WAP 
Male Female Male Female 
e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4 e1 e2 e3 e4 
 Education Fertility                 
2010 (Base-Year) 19.5 9.5 20.0 7.9 34.2 7.2 9.3 4.5 15.0 6.8 14.8 6.4 27.5 5.2 6.1 3.2 
2030 
Constant 
High 20.6 21.3 31.0 14.6 38.7 21.2 15.5 10.4 15.4 16.6 24.4 13.0 29.0 16.5 13.1 9.2 
Medium 20.4 21.0 30.5 15.5 38.4 20.8 16.3 10.3 15.4 16.6 24.4 13.0 29.0 16.5 13.1 9.2 
NG 20.5 21.2 30.8 14.6 38.6 21.0 16.5 10.3 15.4 16.6 24.4 13.0 29.0 16.5 13.1 9.2 
Trend 
High 20.4 21.3 31.1 14.7 38.2 21.3 16.7 10.6 15.4 16.6 24.4 13.0 28.8 16.5 13.1 9.3 
Medium 20.3 20.9 30.7 14.6 37.9 20.9 16.4 10.5 15.4 16.6 24.4 13.0 28.8 16.5 13.1 9.3 
NG 20.4 21.1 31.0 14.7 38.1 21.2 16.7 10.6 15.4 16.6 24.4 13.0 28.8 16.5 13.1 9.3 
NG 
High 18.8 21.0 30.9 17.0 34.7 19.2 20.3 12.7 15.4 16.3 23.4 14.2 28.2 15.1 14.2 10.4 
Medium 18.7 20.7 30.4 16.8 34.7 18.9 19.7 12.4 15.4 16.3 23.4 14.2 28.2 15.1 14.2 10.4 
NG 18.7 20.9 30.7 16.9 34.7 19.1 20.1 12.6 15.4 16.3 23.4 14.2 28.2 15.1 14.2 10.4 
2060 
Constant 
High 22.3 39.7 45.0 23.1 42.6 43.9 27.6 19.8 16.1 32.1 31.5 17.8 28.8 35.6 19.1 14.9 
Medium 19.4 33.9 38.9 20.3 37.3 37.6 23.9 17.3 13.8 27.6 27.1 15.3 24.8 30.6 16.4 12.8 
NG 19.2 33.5 38.5 20.2 36.9 37.1 23.7 17.2 13.8 27.4 27.0 15.2 24.7 30.4 16.3 12.8 
Trend 
High 19.8 39.9 46.6 24.0 33.3 46.9 30.1 23.2 14.2 31.8 32.7 18.6 21.9 37.9 20.7 17.8 
Medium 17.5 33.5 40.2 21.0 30.2 39.8 25.8 20.0 12.3 27.3 28.1 15.9 19.3 32.4 17.7 15.1 
NG 17.4 33.2 39.7 20.9 30.2 39.3 25.4 19.8 12.3 27.2 27.9 15.9 19.3 32.2 17.5 15.0 
NG 
High 8.5 29.8 42.4 45.1 17.0 30.1 38.2 44.3 4.4 24.9 28.7 37.0 7.1 24.9 27.3 36.6 
Medium 8.4 26.5 37.2 38.3 16.9 26.8 33.0 37.4 4.3 22.1 24.9 31.2 7.1 22.0 23.6 30.8 
NG 8.4 26.5 36.8 37.7 16.9 26.8 32.6 36.8 4.3 22.1 24.9 30.8 7.1 22.1 23.5 30.3 
